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emphasized that "it would be cruel and inhuman punishment to deport
this petitioner to Czechoslovakia, belonging as he does to the race which
is thus being persecuted and exiled, especially when the charge against
him is that at the time of his entry he was not in possession of an unex-
pired immigration visa."33 If this language looks to the Eighth Amend-
ment, it is clear that the instant court has departed from the prior deci-
sions and has extended the scope of this constitutional provision. It has
been held that the punishment imposed for a violation of a statute, which
is within the punishment provided for by the statute, cannot be regarded
as excessive, cruel, or unusual,34 though there is dicta indicating that
courts might interfere with the Congressional function of fixing penalties
and punishments where such are clearly and manifestly cruel and un-
usual.3" Conclusive, however, is the fact that deportation proceedings
are of a civil nature, to which constitutional rights of the type guaranteed
by the Eighth Amendment are inapplicable;" indeed, there is an express
holding, where the alien pleaded the Eighth Amendment, that the
deportation of an alien is not punishment within the meaning of that
amendment.3" MYRON D. OLIVER
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
APPELLATE PROCEDURE - FINAL ORDER, ORDER GRANTING
NEW TRIAL NOT.
"In the opinion of the court, the courts of this state have gone the
limit in construing court orders as 'final' . . . and the attempt to make
the setting aside of a verdict and the granting of a new trial a final
order . . . violates the Constitution. . . " Thus wrote Judge Hart
in his opinion in the recent Ohio case of Hoffman v. Knollman1 which
reaffirmed the concept of finality as the touchstone of Ohio appellate
practice and set forth the rule that the principle could not be disturbed
by legislative definition.
The case involved an action to contest a will, wherein the jury had
returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant had filed a motion
for a new trial which was sustained. The plaintiff then appealed to the
Court of Appeals assigning as error that the motion should have been
" U. S. ex rel. Weinberg v. Schlotfeldt, 26 Fed. Supp. 283, 284 (1938).
" Hernandez v. U. S., IS Fed. (2d) 19o (1926).
" Bailey V. U. S., 74 Fed. (2d) 451 (1934)-
'6 Ah Lin v. U. S., 20 Fed. (zd) 1o7 (1927).
' Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 56 Fed. (2d) 566 (1932), affirmed without reference to
this point in 287 U.S. 341, 53 S.Ct. I5z (1932).
'135 Ohio St. 170, 186, zo N.E. (2d) 221 (1939)-
stricken from the files on the ground that it had not been made during
the term at which the verdict had been rendered. Thereupon the
defendant moved to dismiss the appeal for the reason that no final order
or judgment had been made by the trial court from which an appeal
could be taken to the appellate court. The Court of Appeals granted
the defendant's motion and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court,
after holding that the record contained no indication of a failure to move
for a new trial within the proper time, proceeded to discuss the constitu-
tional aspects of the case.
The basis of the decision is to be found in the unique2 provision of
the Ohio Constitution creating the Courts of Appeals and limiting their
jurisdiction to the review, aflirmance, modification, or reversal of judg-
ments of courts of record.' The judicial construction of the term
"judgments" included "final orders,"' and the statutory provision per-
mitting review of judgments and final orders became part of the Appel-
late Procedure Act.5 A final order was defined in that Act as "an
order affecting a substantial right in an action, when in effect it deter-
mines the action and prevents a judgment, or an order affecting a sub-
stantial right made in a special proceeding, or upon a summary application
in an action after judgment."6 In 1937 the General Assembly amended
the Act by adding to the statutory definition "an order vacating or
setting aside a general verdict of a jury and ordering a new trial.""
In defense of the amendment it was argued that the Constitution
must be broadly and liberally construed, that the definition of constitu-
tional terms is properly within the province of the legislature, that similar
statutes exist in many states, that such statutes shorten litigation and
lessen expense, and that an order granting a new trial is a final order as
to the right of the successful party to a judgment on the verdict.'
While Mr. Justice Hart, writing the opinion of the Court in Hoff-
man v. Knollmran, admitted that many of these arguments were valid,
he insisted that they hinged upon the "policy or propriety" of the action
2 Only one other state constitution impinges upon the uniqueness of the Ohio Consti-
tution. The Idaho Constitution contains a provision similar to that of Ohio, except for the
fact that the term "decisions" is substituted for the term "judgments." Art. V, see. 9.
Pursuant to this provision, the Idaho Legislature was permitted to provide for a direct
appeal from an order granting a new trial. Weiser Irrigation District v. Middle Valley
Irrigation Ditch Co., zS Idaho 548, 155 Pac. 484 (1916).
* Art. IV, sec. 6.
'Chandler & Taylor Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 3o4 Ohio St. 18S, 135 N.E. 6zo
(1922).
' Ohio General Code, sec. ZZZ3-27. This provision replaced Ohio General Code,
sec. 32247.
" Ohio General Code, sec. 12223-z. This provision replaced Ohio General Code,
sec. zzS8.
Ohio General Code, sec. 12223-2, effective August 23, 1937.
' Hoffman v. Knollman, 135 Ohio St. 170, 18o, 2o N.E. (2d) 221 (1939).
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of the legislature rather than on the constitutionality of the amendment.9
He maintained that the constitutional tampering of 1912 "took away
from the legislature the right to fix, determine, and modify the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Appeals and placed it securely in the Constitution
itself."" He pointed out that the specific limitation of jurisdiction to
to the review of "judgments" was done deliberately "to accelerate liti-
gation by curtailing reviews and to increase the efficiency of the courts
of appeals by preventing possible overloads which might occur if the
jurisdiction could be increased by legislative enactment."" The legisla-
tive effort to make the setting aside of a verdict and the granting of a
new trial a final order was assailed, not only as being unconstitutional,
but as withdrawing "all limitation against future enlargement of the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals by legislative enactment"-a result
which would "make a mockery out of the constitutional limitation of the
jurisdiction of that court." 2 In the mind of the Supreme Court, the
very nature of a decision or ruling of a trial court in granting a motion
for a new trial indicates that nothing has been attained at this stage of
the proceeding to give it "such finality as is comprehended by the terms
'judgment' or 'final order'," for there has been no determination of the
ultimate rights of the parties." The Court concluded that it was for the
people, if they see fit, to "undo what they deliberately and intentionally
did in 1912.""
The decision in this case will probably be widely criticized by those
who wish to accelerate the processes of judicial procedure and heartily
approved by those who desire to render fixed and definite the customary
forms of legal practice.





"Ibid., 184. However, while Ohio courts have uniformly held that the setting aside
of a general verdict and the granting of a motion for a new trial was not the basis of a
review in the court of appeals, where an abuse of discretion in granting the same is
shown, such an abuse would be subject to direct review. See cases collected at page 183,
ibid. The Federal courts adhere to this rule, as pointed out in Fairmount Glass Works v.
Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 77 L.Ed. 439, 53 S.Ct. Z5' (1933), and cases cited
therein. Most of the states concur in the view, in spite of the absence of special statutes.
Egan v. Standard Oil Co. of Nebraska, x3z Neb. pi8, 272 N.W. 327 (1937)i State v.
Hunter, 131 Minn. 252, 154 N.W. 1083 (9gxS); State v. Zimmerman, 6o N.D. z56, 233
N.W. 845, 79 A.L.R. 8x6 (1930); Scott v. Waggoner, 48 Mont. S36, 139 Pac. 454
(x9x4); McMahon v. Rhode Island Co., 32 R.I. 237, 78 Ad. zo± (19xs); State v.
Hadhins, 121 S.C. 290, 114 S.E. S38 (1922)5 Crosby v. Canino, 89 Coo. 434, 3 Pac.
(2d) 792, 78 A.L.R. 12o2 (93)i Wyeman v. Deady, 79 Conn. 414, 65 Atl. 29,
11S Am. St. Rep. 152, 8 Ann. Cas. 375 (go6); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Murphey,
113 Ga. 514, 38 S.E. 970 (igoi); Macartney v. Shipherd, 6o Ore. 133, 117 Pac. 814
(1911).
" Hoffman v. Knollman, 135 Ohio St. 170, 187, 20 N.E. (2d) 221 (939).
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into the king's court and attacked a decision rendered in a feudal or
manorial court was the complaint of false judgment. 5 It was soon de-
cided, however, that the king's court could not be charged with a false
judgment. The king's bench, therefore, was forced to use writs of
error in order to correct mistakes in the other common law courts. The
common law decisions involving writs of error are dearly the origin of
our rule that only final judgments are appealable.'
When the appellate courts in this country commenced to be bur-
dened with appeals, they used as an escape the ready-made device which
had its origin in the appellate procedure of the English common law.
This purpose of preventing congestion in the appellate courts is the
ground upon which the rule permitting appeals from final judgments
only is generally based. While it is true that to some extent it prevents
a case from being presented for review in fragments, it nonetheless has
caused protracted and repeated litigation over the question of what judg-
ments and orders are final. If rigidly adhered to, it relieves only the
strain upon the reviewing court, and the trial court is left to dispose of
its docket as best it can. In the last analysis, the final judgment, strictly
construed, would seem to be a criterion wholly inadequate to determine
whether an appeal should be allowed from a given decision.
At least twenty-eight of the states,"z admittedly possessing con-
stitutional provisions raising no doubt as to the power of the legislature
to act,'" have passed statutes permitting an appeal to be taken from an
25 z Pollock and Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, (zd ed. 1899), p. 666.
'L See Mr. Justice Lamar's opinion in McLishi v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 35 L.Ed. 893,
i2 S.Ct. xi8 (i8g).
'. Alabama Code, i928, sec. 6o88; Arizona, Revised Code (gz8), sec. 36S9;
Arkansas, Civil Code (x934), sec. z5; California, Code of Civil Procedure (1937), sec.
963; Connecticut, General Statutes (930), sec. 5693i Florida, General Laws (19z7), sec.
4615; Georgia, Code (1933), sec. 6-803; Idaho, Code (1932), sec. 11-zo; Illinois, Civil
Practice Act (1933), sec. 77(); Iowa, Code (1935), sec. iz823(3); Kansas, General
Statutes (935), sec. 60-330z; Minnesota, Mason's Statutes (927), sec. 9498; Mississippi
Code Annot. (930), sec. 593; Missouri, Ann. Statutes (193z), sec. IoIS; Montana,
Revised Code (935), sec. 9735i Nevada, Compiled Laws of 1929, sec. 8375; New York,
Civil Practice Act, sees. 588 and 6o9; North Carolina, Code of 1935, sec. 638; North
Dakota, Compiled Laws (1931), sec. 7841; Oklahoma, Okla. St. Ann. (1937), Title 12,
sec. 95z; Oregon, Code of 1930, sec. 7-50;i Rhode Island, Gen. Laws of R. 1. (19z3),
secs. ];sS, £12.5; South Carolina, Code of Laws (1932), sec. z6-D-(z); South Dakota,
Compiled Laws (gz9), sec. 3168i Virginia, Virginia Code (936), sec. 6363; Washing-
ton, Remington's Comp. St. 1922, sec. 1716; West Virginia, Code of 1937, sec. 5787i
Wisconsin, Statutes of 1937, sec. 274.33-
' In Arkansas, however, the Constitution is very similar to our own, allowing review
of final judgments only. Art. 7, Sec. 33. However, the statute, though in force and
availed of for many years, has not been questioned.
In Oregon the Constitution, like ours, grants to the Supreme Court jurisdiction to
review only "final decisions." Art. 7, sec. 6. A statute defining a ruling granting a new
trial as a final decision was considered by the Supreme Court of Oregon in Blumauer-
Frank Drug Co. v. Horticultural Fire Relief of Oregon, 59 Ore. S8, 112 Pac. 1o84 (sgi),
and held to be constitutional. The court held it properly within the province of the legisla-
ture to define terms used in the Constitution.
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order setting aside a general verdict of a jury and granting a new trial.
Thus, the action of the Ohio General Assembly in amending the Ap-
pellate Procedure Act was in line with the general trend throughout
the country.
It seems unfortunate that the Supreme Court of this state, in the
light of the widespread tendency to enact legislation of the kind under
consideration and in the light of the proven benefits derived therefrom,
should have seen fit to take such a narrow and formal view of the con-
stitutional provision. The effect of the decision is to place Ohio appel-
late procedure in a virtual straight-jacket by insisting that the definition
of the term final order be confined to those orders which have in the
past been recognized as final. The right of a successful party to a
judgment on the verdict which has been rendered in his favor would
certainly seem to be a substantial right which, when finally determined,
might fairly be deemed to be a final determination of the party's right
to that verdict. If it could reasonably be considered as such, the legisla-
ture ought to have the power to call it a final order and bring it within
the realm of the appellate court's procedure. The action of the General
Assembly in so doing need not have been considered as enlarging the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, for it merely provided by law for
the exercise of jurisdiction already conferred.
While the Supreme Court deplores the treatment of the term
"judgments" in a limited sense, 9 it has itself given that term a greatly
restricted meaning in narrowing the definition of final order.
GEORGE A. WARP,
Western Reserve University,
Department of Political Science.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE
CHATTEL MORTGAGES- IS THE MORTGAGEE PROTECTED BY
THE RECORDING ACT?
In two recent lower court cases the question of priority of a recorded
chattel mortgage has been under consideration. In the first case the
defendant was the chattel mortgagee of an automobile sold to one James
Goltie. The mortgage was duly filed in the recorder's office. While
such mortgage was on file, Goltie purchased four tires from the plaintiff
under a conditional sale agreement. The new tires were placed on the
mortgaged car by the plaintiff and the conditional sale agreement was
" Hoffman v. Knollman, 13S Ohio St. 170, 176-79, zo N.E. (zd) zz (x939).
